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In Spain, the potential breakdown of the government pact sealed in October 2023 between Pedro Sánchez, Secretary-General of the PSOE, and Yolanda Díaz, then leader of Sumar, is now at the center of political debate. Within the radical left coalition, some voices are openly calling for a withdrawal from the government to «reconnect with voters» following the electoral setback on March 15 in Castile and León.
In that election, the parties grouped under the Sumar banner, along with Podemos, secured just 36,860 votes, less than 3% of the total, leaving them without representation. By contrast, the PSOE improved on its 2022 result, gaining two seats to reach 33 deputies, placing it level with the People's Party (PP), which also secured 33 seats.
In this context, the prospect of a split with the PSOE, already discussed for several months within parts of Sumar, could further weaken Pedro Sánchez’s government, in power since November 2023. Such a scenario could pave the way for early elections, a development that might benefit the PP and, in particular, the far-right party Vox.
What impact for Morocco and Moroccans in Spain?
A potential return of the right to the Moncloa Palace, after nearly eight years in opposition, would have direct implications for Morocco. The leader of the PP, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, has repeatedly signaled his intention to reconsider the support expressed by Pedro Sánchez for Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, announced on March 18, 2022, a position reaffirmed during high-level bilateral meetings between Rabat and Madrid.
Feijóo has also taken a tougher stance on migration, moving closer to positions advocated by Vox. This shift is raising concerns among the roughly one million Moroccans living in Spain.
The far-right party, led by Santiago Abascal, already holds significant influence in several regions, notably Extremadura, Aragon, and Castile and León, where it plays a key role in forming local governments. Vox conditions its support for the PP on the adoption of stricter policies, including reducing social benefits for immigrants, refusing to accept unaccompanied minors, and suspending programs teaching Arabic language and Moroccan culture, already halted since the 2025–2026 school year in regions such as Madrid and Murcia.
This dynamic, already visible at the regional level, could extend nationally. Most polls do not give the PP the absolute majority sought by Feijóo, meaning a return to power would likely depend on an agreement with Vox, involving significant political concessions.
Such an alliance could prove unfavorable for Morocco, particularly on sensitive issues such as agriculture and fisheries, and could also directly affect Moroccans residing in Spain.
The racist violence that occurred last July in the Murcia region has already highlighted the tangible risks associated with the normalization of far-right discourse and practices within Spain’s political landscape.
